



Center for Slavic and East European Studies

University of California
Berkeley, California
94720

Newsletter

RECEIVED

MAY 08 1994

LIBRARY - P.A.O.I.

Spring 1994
Vol. 8 No. 3

Russian Women in Transition

A Conversation With Valerie Sperling

In This Issue:

Women's Issues, Women's
Lives in the New Russia P.1

No confidence: The Polish
Parliament in Disarray P.3

Tracing the History of
Language Through
Grammatical Structures P.5

Fellowships P.9

ASC News P.10

Calendar of Events P.11

Valerie Sperling is a third-year graduate student in the Department of Political Science and the Berkeley-Stanford Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies. An IREX research grant recipient for 1994-95, Valerie plans to spend several months in Russia researching her dissertation, "Engendering Transition: Women's Movements in Russia and Ukraine." She attended the Second Independent Women's Forum in 1992. Her article, "Creating a Women's Movement in the C.I.S.," appeared in the Spring 1993 issue of Khronika, the newsletter of the Berkeley-Stanford Program.

Anne Hawkins: I'd like to start with the Gorbachev era, really the recent past, although so much has happened it seems like the distant past. You've written that Gorbachev appeared to be ambivalent about the role of women in public life. Explain?

Valerie Sperling: Gorbachev devoted only a couple of pages in his 1987 book, *Perestroika*, to women's issues. He wanted to facilitate the return of women to their "purely womanly mission" of homemaking and raising the children; but he also talked about the need to promote more women into leadership positions, in politics and the economy. He did have a woman, Alexandra Biriukova, on his Politburo for two years, but as far as I know, little if anything was done to promote women in general.

How did women fare in politics during the period, say, from Brezhnev on?

Until 1989, women made up about 33 percent of the USSR Supreme Soviet; but since the Supreme Soviet was a rubberstamp legislature with virtually no power, the statistic is rather meaningless. A better indicator of who held power in the state was the Central Committee

with only 4 or 5 percent women, the same percentage as our Congress. Worse, those women who had traditionally held seats in the Central Committee were not as powerful in Soviet society as the men holding corresponding positions. They were "milkmaids" or "heroines of socialist labor," instructed how to vote from above. One or two women had independent power bases, but they were the exception. When elections were held in 1989 to the new USSR Congress of Peoples Deputies with 2,250 members, the number of women plummeted to about 15-16 percent, because the quota system for women was eliminated. Quotas did remain for a variety of public organizations, including the Soviet Women's Committee, which controlled 75 seats, all filled by women.

By 1990 the percentage of women elected to the Russian Congress of Peoples Deputies had dropped to 5.4 percent; it collapsed very quickly. At present the corresponding bodies have more political significance, so any woman elected would not be just a token representative. In the December 1993 Russian elections, a new party, Women of Russia, had a slate of about 40 women, 23 of whom made it into the Duma. There were about 31 women in total elected from all the other parties, so the new Duma is 12 to 13 percent female.

I want to talk about Women of Russia, but let's stay with the late reform period for a moment. Were women getting jobs on the side to make ends meet during this time?

I suspect less so than men did. At first the cooperative movement under Gorbachev consisted largely of restaurants and retail sales, so probably some women were involved. Anecdotally speaking, several of my

PROCESSED

JUN 08 2006

GTU LIBRARY

male Russian friends have had such jobs, and not many of my women Russian friends have. But when you think about it, how would women have found time for second jobs when they were standing in lines, cooking, cleaning, caring for children, and so on?

Do you know of any swashbuckling entrepreneurial women in Russia now?

Yes. Irina Khakamada is pretty well-known; in fact, she's one of the new members of parliament. I've also heard there are a lot of women starting small businesses; there were several organizations for business women at a women's forum I attended. It's definitely a growing phenomenon as women are being pushed out of the public sector.

Give us a brief outline of what happened to women in the post-1990 period.

For one thing, I read that when the state administrative apparatus was cut, as many as 80 percent of those laid off were women. Second and more obviously, with the collapse of the Soviet state and the attempts to make a transition toward a market economy, funding for enterprises was cut drastically. There are overlapping problems in this situation. First is the problem of reduced social welfare benefits such as maternity leave, which, as of 1991, was available for a three-year period, with 18 weeks of partial pay. But with privatization, many enterprises were no longer picking up the costs of maternity leave, childcare and so forth. Some employers were very direct: We don't have to hire women at all and we're not going to. I've heard of situations where jobs were advertised for men only, or where women who applied for receptionist positions were asked to supply a picture of themselves in a mini-skirt. Many women have lost their jobs, at all levels of education and experience.

What are these women doing to survive?

It's now possible to register for unemployment. Between 70 and 80 percent of those who have registered are women. The figures may not accurately reflect the unemployment situation, since, as I said, more men may have side jobs and so they might not register. Some women are receiving job retraining, and are going to job placement services.

You attended the 1992 Second International Women's Forum in Dubna, Russia. Where's Dubna?

It's about a two hour and twenty minute ride on the train from Moscow, nowhere near as far from the city as that travel-time would indicate!

You said that at the First Women's Forum in 1991 some 200 women participated from 48 groups. That's very good. What was participation like at the second forum?

It increased. There were around 500 participants, including representatives from over 60 groups; that figure includes foreign representatives.

How did the first forum come about?

It was organized primarily by women at the Moscow Center for Gender Studies. Members of SAFO, the Free Association of Feminist Organizations, NEZHDI, which is an acronym for, in translation, "Don't Wait," and other organizations. You have to understand, though, when they say "Association of Feminist Organizations," they're talking about a very small group of people!

Describe the participants in the second forum: where did they come from? Why were they there? How old were they...?

The majority of groups there were from Russia, and over one-half of these were from Moscow and St. Petersburg. Some rural women attended too; there were women from a farmers' association, for instance. Most participants were 30 and over; there weren't a lot of very young representatives; the young women there were mostly translators and Gender Center staff. One woman from Ukraine told me she thought most of the women there were just old party people, still attached to the establishment, though I didn't really get that sense.

What sorts of groups were there?

They were very diverse. A lot of groups were concerned with business and employment issues. There were charities, mutual support associations, professional associations, organizations opposed to violence against women, and some women's studies centers. One group I particularly remember was formed to "preserve women's femininity and creativity in the face of the Chernobyl disaster." But by far the largest bloc was devoted to business, job training and employment issues.

A lot of these organizations seemed to be on economically shaky ground. Many of the participants came up to the mike during the welcoming ceremonies and said, "We're such and such an organization, and we're looking for a sponsor!" I spoke to one woman who was running a service trying to put unemployed women together in small businesses. She said her organization was working *besplatno*—for free. She admitted that this wasn't sustainable. The sense I got was that resources are very slim. The

The Inept Get a Wake-Up Call

By Carrie Timko

It sounds like something out of a short story by Gogol: a humble official happens to oversleep one day, so the government collapses. Last June when the Polish government of Hanna Suchocka was facing yet another legitimacy crisis, a hapless deputy slept through his alarm, missed the vote of no confidence, and brought down the government by a vote of 223-222.

When I set off for Poland last spring, I was prepared to find the new hallmarks of post-communist politics: xenophobia, corruption, disillusionment. But I was surprised instead to find the politics of blunder and ineptitude. After watching the botched vote of no confidence and subsequent mistake-ridden election campaign, I decided that social science might be of limited use in analyzing all this bungling. I may have to leave it to a new Gogol to capture this essential absurdity of post-communist life.

On the day following the government's collapse, President Lech Walesa dissolved the parliament. In one fell swoop, my dissertation on the elitism and stunted growth of Polish political parties disappeared. I had been studying how the extreme fragmentation of the *Sejm* (Polish parliament) made it very difficult to form stable majorities, with party memberships, alliances, and ministerships always up for grabs; politicians focused on internal parliamentary politics and winning perks rather than on building party organizations. With more than 30 parties, voters could hardly keep track of who was who amidst the constantly changing alliances. So both the public and the politicians themselves believed that there was little accountability in the *Sejm*.

As I was determining the long-term implications of this indifference, Walesa suddenly dissolved the parliament two years before its term was to end. In the new elections, only six parties made it into the *Sejm* with two parties controlling over 65% of the seats. The political games due to fragmentation had ended and now entirely new strategies would now come into play.

Such sudden changes are par for the course in the post-communist world. We have come to expect cabinets to fall in a flash, countries to split and reunify overnight, or even the parliament to come under armed attack. Until I witnessed such a turn of events for myself in Poland, however, I had no idea that such political earthquakes could be set off by the most mundane events. Glued to my tv set on the day of the vote of no confidence, I inventoried all the reasons why the government would or would not fall. Yes, this was the first post-communist Polish government likely to see positive GDP growth and to make an effort to build public

Walesa's Act was probably his single-most popular move in the last four years. People had long felt that the members of parliament were arrogant and ignored the plight of average citizens. Everyone felt a collective thrill when the whole lot was fired in a single stroke.

consensus for reform. But unemployment was reaching 15%; the coalition which once held a slight majority was now in the minority; and its member parties were too weak to deliver all their deputies' votes. Even so, that morning Suchocka and her ministers were confident. By their headcount, they should just barely win the vote. Even the government's opposition thought she would carry the day. In all the counting, however, no one had taken into account the somnambulist habits of MP Zbigniew Dyka. He knew the 9:00 a.m. vote would be a problem. He had set two alarms, requested a hotel wake-up call, and even asked his wife to call from home to be certain he got up. But in the end, sleep got the better of him and the Polish political scene was thrown into disarray.

No one knew what would happen next. A radical opposition party immediately nominated an unknown candidate from their fold as prime minister, while no other party had a candidate prepared. Many of those voting against Suchocka had thought the parliament would have a chance to name a new cabinet and that their parties might win new posts. But due to a technicality in the law that few deputies understood before the vote, since the motion of no confidence did not include a nomination for a new premier, the president now had the right to dissolve the parliament. Before the deputies could grasp the full consequences of what they had chosen, Walesa did dissolve the *Sejm* and set them packing their bags.

Walesa's act was probably his single-most popular move in the last four years. People had long felt that the members of parliament were arrogant and ignored the plight of average citizens. Everyone felt a collective thrill when the whole lot was fired in a single stroke. Poles were all snickering that the deputies who had introduced painful economic reforms would now know some of the pain themselves, as they joined the ranks of the unemployed.

In the months that followed leading up to new elections September 19th, I was continually amazed at the ineptitude of the politicians. All of my social science indicators

pointed to a clear victory for two left-wing parties: the former Communist party, the Alliance of the Left (SLD), and the Polish Peasants Union (PSL), a long-term ally of the Communists. Published opinion polls and my informal polls in shops and on street corners all agreed. Yet somehow all the non-communist parties were engaging in collective denial. They spent the next four months attacking each other instead of their real rivals, SLD and PSL.

By keeping a low profile and patiently waiting in the opposition, the Communists were swept back into power, a mere four years after they had been swept out by a landslide in Poland's first free elections.

They had all been involved earlier in writing new election rules designed to end party fragmentation by making it much harder for parties to get into the *Sejm*. They all agreed to the threshold that now required parties to win 5% of the vote to receive any seats at all. This would be a tall order, since polls in June showed that only 6 of the top 15 parties had over 5% of public support. Moreover, these six were mostly communist, leftist or radical parties, so the center and the right could be completely left out of the new *Sejm*.

Instead of addressing this crisis, Poland's right-wing parties could only bicker about who would form a coalition with whom, how they would divide up the coalition's seats, and who would be in charge. All the twists-and-turns of these battles were more complicated than the latest plot on "Dynasty" and made the headlines all summer long. But in the end, all these parties were left out in the cold and there were no seats to be divided.

Everyone was aware that the new election rules gave parties a great deal of incentive to band together. Coalitions that won 10% or more of the vote would get far more than 10% of the seats. But that still could not compel two center parties that were considered relatively more reasonable and politically astute to form a coalition. *Unia Demokratyczna* (center-left) and *Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny* (center-right) could not nail down a coalition agreement despite late-night negotiations and their previous long-standing cooperation in Suchocka's government. They decided it was just too hard to cooperate and that they'd rather remain separate and ideologically pure than band together. Their decision to forego the electoral benefits of a large coalition, however, ended up giving even more seats to the large SLD and PSL blocks.

By the time that all of the parties had decided who they would run with and the ballots were printed, it was clear that some serious miscalculation was going on. To me it seemed the non-communist parties were all engaging in creative and optimistic survey research analysis. Instead of factoring in the margin of error of "plus or minus 3 percentage points," they all seemed to be reading "plus 3 to 5 percentage points." During election night tv coverage, party leaders were all asked to estimate the percentage of the vote they would win. Clearly some of them were being far too optimistic, since the total of their estimates was well over 200%. In the end, several major political groupings were kept out of parliament by this error that started as a "few percentage points."

One group that had appeared to be calculating their support properly was still left out in the cold. A right-wing Christian Democratic coalition called "Fatherland" was formed out of four smaller parties that individually could not make it into the parliament. According to polls taken in the summer, together they might win some 7% of the vote. They did get over 6% of the vote in the September elections but still did not make it into the *Sejm*. How? Due to another silly miscalculation.

The election law that they had helped write set two thresholds: 5% for political parties; 8% for party coalitions. Any grouping could decide for itself how it wished to register, as a single party or as a coalition of parties. And many groups who registered as a single "party" were indeed made up of several separate parties. But Fatherland decided for no good reason other than excessive ambition to aim for the 8% threshold, and it aimed itself right out of the parliament.

While all the non-communist parties were doing creative calculating and back-biting, the former communist SLD and PSL were poised for an electoral landslide. Together they won 36% of the vote, but 65% of the seats in the *Sejm*. And considering that just over half of those eligible voted, only 19% of Polish citizens actually cast ballots for this bloc that now controls two-thirds of the *Sejm* seats. They let the other parties fight amongst themselves and prove to the voters that they were incapable of governing. In the meantime they mobilized their own constituencies as well as voters who were now tired of the hardships of economic reform. By keeping a low profile and patiently waiting in the opposition, the Communists were swept back into power, a mere four years after they had been swept out by a landslide in Poland's first free elections.

Chance events, simple misunderstandings and slight miscalculations are having earthshaking consequences in the post-communist world. In the era of Gorbachev, we

You Say Tomayto, and I Say Tomahto

Using a Detailed Grammatical Map as Guide,
Nichols Traces Language Far Back in Time

by Patricia McBroom

Reprinted from the February 23 - March 1 1994 issue of the *Berkeleyan*

The common ancestor of the world's modern languages appears to be at least 100,000 years old, according to new linguistic research by Johanna Nichols, professor of Slavic languages.

This new evidence of the antiquity of modern language is based upon the largest comparison of grammatical structures ever done. It suggests languages arose long before modern humans spread out around the globe, while they were still inhabiting tropical regions of Asia, Africa and the Near East. Some 200 language families were involved in the comparisons. Nichols' sample represents most of the 300 language families spoken on earth. (The family of Indo-European languages is one example.)

Prior to this, comparative linguistics could only reach back in time to some 8,000 years ago. Nichols' method builds on this comparative data to calculate the ages of large groups of families. Using an unprecedented number of grammatical comparisons, she also has been able to trace the migration of languages out of Africa, homeland of the human race, to Southeast Asia and from there around the world beginning around 50,000 years ago.

"It is amazing that anything at all can be said about language at a time depth of 50,000 years ago, using reliable, established linguistic methods," said Nichols.

As one result of her analysis, Nichols believes that humans reached the New World at about the same time that Cro-Magnon populations (modern humans) settled in Western Europe, some 35,000 to 40,000 years ago. Such early dates challenge the accepted view of a much more recent origin for New World colonization. Nichols' estimates of the ages of modern languages are based on grammatical comparisons of certain stable features in language that change little over time—features having to do with transitive and intransitive verbs, subject-object relationships, the gendering of nouns, the ways in which singular/plural are designated, and inclusive/exclusive first-person pronouns. Related languages share similarities in these deep structures, while unrelated languages do not.

Using an average age of 5,000 years for each family (Indo-European is believed to be 6,000 years old), and a

branching rate of 1.6 languages per family, Nichols concluded that the time it would take to create existing global diversity is at least 100,000 years. This means that by the time humans spread out from the tropics, they already had a wide range of different languages which they carried to the four corners of the globe, said Nichols.

In earlier research, Nichols has determined that the diversity among languages in the New World is so great that they would have required some 35,000 years to diversify. Of the 300 language families in the world, 130 of them are in the Western Hemisphere. Only Australia and New Guinea, areas that were colonized some 50,000 years ago, have as many unrelated languages, said Nichols.

Eurasia, by contrast, is linguistically much more unified, although diversity would have been greater before the spread of the Indo-European languages beginning about 4,000 BC, said Nichols. Nichols also challenges the theory that New World languages can be traced back to one super-family called "Amerind." There must have been about 10 separate infusions of new language groups into the New World to create so much diversity in 35,000 years, she said.

Her conclusions concerning the age of New World languages support recent genetic evidence that native populations in the Western Hemisphere are much older than generally accepted. An Emory University team reported earlier this year that research on the mitochondrial DNA of 18 indigenous tribes dispersed throughout the Americas indicates that humans have been in the New World for some 30,000 years.

The traditional archaeological view holds that humans migrated to the New World only 12,000 years ago, but two disputed sites in South America date back to 30,000 years ago. "Our evidence supports the earlier dates," said Nichols. □



Gender Center in Moscow has funding; and perhaps some of the business schools are marginally better off, because their students pay tuition.

How optimistic are you that groups can hold themselves together?

Not terribly. I think it cuts both ways. On the one hand, people have neither time nor money to devote to women's groups. On the other hand, if you're unemployed and you need to find a job, you're pretty likely to seek out a group that can help. That's what it takes, of course, the realization that by banding together you may be better able to reach your goals. And obviously, for many women at the forum, this notion had occurred to them--that's why they were there.

Were there motives other than economic that might have brought these women together?

I think some women are genuinely fed up with the treatment women have gotten in Russia. The slogan of the first forum was "Democracy without women is not democracy." They felt strongly that the participation of women in politics should not be delayed until the economy had been restored. But then again, people are so disgusted with politics that this may not have been a motivating factor. It's hard to say whether women for the most part really want to be involved in politics.

What were the accomplishments of the Second Women's Forum?

Several concrete resolutions came out of the forum. They came up with a list of things they'd like the government to do, such as creating training and retraining programs for women, and state financing of pre-schools. The other primary accomplishment was the opportunity for networking. During the welcoming ceremonies, I sat in the cold auditorium hour after hour watching women scribble down the phone numbers of women speakers; this was their only opportunity to get them. At a workshop on women and violence, I saw connections made between women working on rape issues that in all likelihood would not have been made otherwise.

Are there newsletters or other publications targeted to them?

There's a newspaper called *Delovaia zhenshchina*, roughly, *Business Woman*, that has a decent-sized circulation of about 100,000, but it certainly isn't sold in every kiosk. Some others exist, but they're not published on a regular basis. For example, Olga Lipovskaia publishes *Zhenskoe chtenie*, *Women's Reading*, in St. Petersburg,

Well, I think a lot of people still expect the state to provide job security and benefits. I think they *do* have ties to the social welfare network, so there's the paradox of a generally negative attitude toward communism but a positive attitude toward social guarantees.

but it's self-published, with perhaps ten or twelve copies each edition. She prints translations of feminist material from the West. Of course there was the *Almanac: Woman and Russia*, put together by some Leningrad feminists in 1979; it was crushed pretty quickly, but has recently been regenerated as *Woman and Earth*.

To what do you attribute the lack of solidarity among Russian women?

In any country some of the problems in building a cohesive women's movement are the same: women have crosscutting ties to family, men, regions, religions, etc. Another obstacle to unity that's a peculiar legacy of former socialist countries is a widespread reaction against hierarchies. One example in the women's movement is that after the first forum, it was decided not to try to turn the forum into a national, centralized women's organization. Part of the reason was the question of resources: the women at the Moscow Gender Center probably realized they didn't have the staff or the funds to handle it. But participants also expressed a distrust of centrally-planned organizations.

It's interesting, isn't it? On the one hand, I'm sure women make the connection between the old regime and the benefits and jobs they've lost, yet on the other the central government was so repressive that this memory seems to override all other considerations.

Well, I think a lot of people still expect the state to provide job security and benefits. I think they *do* have ties to the social welfare network, so there's the paradox of a generally negative attitude toward communism but a positive attitude toward social guarantees. What they *don't* seem to understand is the necessity for extremely high taxes that accompanies the social programs in the Scandinavian states, for instance.

Aren't most Russian women aware of the European model of the welfare state and how it operates?

I'm not so sure about that. When people in Russia think about taxes, they recall the impossibly high taxes that were imposed at first on private enterprises. People were really reluctant to start up such enterprises or to invest in them.

The same might be said for their understanding of feminism. Many women have expressed the notion that feminism just doesn't apply, and to some extent this is quite true. They think feminism is for countries that have a certain standard of living, where people have the time to concern themselves with such things.

Women living under communist regimes have just gotten access to consumer items such as cosmetics and better clothes.

Yes, that's true. Some women disparage feminists as being stereotypically drab and unattractive. Another objection you hear is that the enemy is not men, it's the state. Not that I believe men are the enemy—but for the most part, men did run the communist state, and often they didn't take women's concerns into consideration. Then there's also the notion that feminism is tainted because it's linked with communism, in that both share the rhetoric of equality. Russian women have had the opportunity to see clearly that being equal to men means being exploited along with them. Being "equal" means having two full-time jobs, one at work and one at home.

Finally, Russian women don't want to be dictated to. Western feminists have been known to tell them what they should do to be really liberated. Russian women have a strong sense of wanting to do things in their own way, finding answers to their problems that are appropriate for them. One last point: Russian women are aware that they have to be sensitive to women of other cultures, for example, those in parts of Central Asia, who are still fighting for things like equal education and the right to live more freely. I think we can assume that with the fall of communism there will be further breakdown of communication between women in Russia and women in the other former Soviet states.

So, feminism is not popular, and meanwhile, women are joining the Orthodox Church in large numbers. What's the driving force there? A search for identity?

One spokeswoman for the party was quoted in the *Examiner*, saying, "How can you build a real democracy when more than half the population is denied a meaningful political role?" This is more or less a direct steal from the First Women's Forum slogan: "Democracy without women is not democracy."

Possibly the Russian Orthodox Church offers something like a national identity, a community—and it even provides some services. The women's movement is minuscule and goes back, maybe, five years; the Church is huge and has been in existence for 1,000 years.

Are men joining the church in equal numbers?

I don't know. When I was in Russia in 1986 and we toured a famous monastery, Zagorsk, I saw mainly older women—aside from priests and monks—worshipping and kissing icons. This past summer I was there again and saw men and women of all ages.

Is there a direct connection between the forum you attended and the formation of the political party, Women of Russia?

Not as far as I know. The women's party is to some extent a descendent of the Soviet Women's Committee, which was succeeded in Russia after 1991 by the Russian Union of Women. I don't think the SWC was invited to the first forum. The Soviet Women's Committee originated as an anti-fascist committee in 1941, so from the start its main concern was not to address women's issues. It was designed to mobilize the population to carry out communist party goals. The SWC did change some over time, though. I once did a paper on *Pravda's* coverage of International Women's Day over the years. Starting in the late 1980s, International Women's Day speeches given by the Soviet Women's Committee chair became progressively more honest about the problems women faced on the job, like night work, and dangerous or unhealthy conditions. One of the interesting manifestations of glasnost was that women were able to speak up about such injustices. I can't say the Committee was just a puppet.

When the government collapsed, the Russian Union of Women took over from the Committee, including the appropriation of their very nice building in central Moscow. A variety of groups meet there now. I went to a meeting of one group called "Ecofem," a women's group concerned with ecological issues. I would say they're doing some good.

Was the Union active in forming the party?

It looks like the Union got together with the Association of Women Entrepreneurs and the Association of Navy Women. From what I've heard, a lot of the members are the old *apparatchiks*, military wives and such. Though they were labelled "feminist" in our press, I find that a little hard to believe. We've also heard that they're interested in moving toward a market economy while at the same time preserving social guarantees. On the other hand, when

asked about their position on women's issues, representatives of the women's party mention things like pornography, which they want banned, and other, more typically feminist issues.

It's hard to know how, if at all, these issues will be raised in Parliament. One spokeswoman for the party was quoted in the *Examiner*, saying, "How can you build a real democracy when more than half the population is denied a meaningful political role?" This is more or less a direct steal from the First Women's Forum slogan: "Democracy without women is not democracy."

Who knows if she came up with it on her own or lifted it from the forum's slogan. In any case, the fact that this descendant of the previously state-run women's committee is now speaking in such terms illustrates the importance of having some groups or people around to move the debate to the left. So even if few people paid attention to the forums at the time, the question of women's issues in politics may now move more overtly into the public arena.

What percentage of the vote did Women of Russia get?

Around 8 percent. As I said before, this means that they won about 23 seats in the Duma, which isn't bad. They could be an important part of a coalition. But this Duma is only a two-year body, so they may only be around for two years. However, they started very late, put up 44 candidates, hoped to get 5 percent of the vote and got 8 percent. So they did rather better than they expected.

How did they mount a campaign so quickly?

This is only my suspicion, but they may have used the network of *zhensovety*, women's councils, to get the petition signatures they needed. The women's councils were born in the 1920s, brought back under Krushchev, and then resuscitated by Gorbachev.

Are there any women leaders you see emerging with a feminist agenda?

I'll have to talk to women deputies! As of now there are certainly people like Anastasiia Posadskaia, the head of the Moscow Gender Center, who are trying to get funding for feminist organizations. We have to be careful not to expect the emergence of a Western-style feminism, because Russia is not a Western-style country. Some issues

are the same, some are not. Right now people are trying to keep their families afloat.

Regarding the future of feminism in Russia, I think a lot depends on consciousness-raising and on the degree to which women feel that working together is more efficient than working alone. Feminism is definitely about recognizing the need to work with others who are experiencing the same kind of systematic discrimination. I think that slowly but surely, this kind of picture may be forming in Russia. □

Boris Erdman

Dance sketch, *Electric Dances*, 1923



Newsletter

of the Center for Slavic and East European Studies, University of California at Berkeley.
361 Stephens Hall, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720; phone 510/642-3230.

Editor: Anne Hawkins

The Newsletter is published quarterly during the academic year. Please send suggestions, corrections or inquiries to the editor at the above address. Submit mailing address changes to the Center, Attn.: Newsletter Mailing List; or call the Center at 510/642-3230.

© 1994 by the Center for Slavic and East European Studies.

Fellowships and Other Support Opportunities

Poland / From page 4

The Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures Summer Russian Intensive Workshop 1994. UC Berkeley's Slavic Department announces first- and second-year intensive Russian language workshops, June 6-August 12, 1994. For information on these courses, contact Dr. Arkady Alexeev at 510/642-2393 (through May 16) or 510/524-2554 (May 17-June 3). Contact the Department for Dr. Alexeev's office hours and for further information on the Russian program. Applications are available at the Office of Summer Sessions, 22 Wheeler Hall; 642-5611. The application deadline is **JUNE 3, 1994**.

The competition for **Fulbright lecturing or research awards**. Awards range from two months to an academic year. For information on this program contact the Council for International Exchange of Scholars, 3007 Tilden Street, N.W., Su. 5M, Box GBRO, Washington, D.C. 20008-3009; Bitnet: CIES1@GWUVM.GWU.EDU; phone 202/686-7877. The application deadline is **AUGUST 1, 1994**.

Central European University's Department of Sociology offers two one-year MA-level scholarships to western students. Contact the University at their Prague or Budapest locations for more information. Contact: Prague College: Taboritska 23, POB 114, 130 87 Praha 3, Czech Republic; 42 2/27 43 44; fax: 42 2/27 49 13; Budapest College: Huvosvolgyi utca 54, H-1021, Budapest, Hungary; 36 1/176 3160; fax: 36 1/176 3574. The application deadline is **APRIL 30, 1994**.


The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars announces Junior Scholars Training Seminar. Annual seminar in August for ABD graduate students and junior scholars. Contact: John R. Lampe, director, East European Studies, The Woodrow Wilson Center; 202/2873000, ext. 222; fax 202/287-3772. The application deadline is **APRIL 30, 1994**.

Short-term grants for research to be conducted in Washington, DC, are also available to graduate students as well as post-docs. Contact: John R. Lampe (see above). The deadlines are **JUNE 1, SEPTEMBER 1, DECEMBER 1 AND MARCH 1**.

realized how much "leadership" mattered and how much a single person could accomplish. Today we are learning the consequences of ineptitude and how much one person can mess up.

I have since decided not to write my dissertation on the parliament, since these shaky institutions seem so liable to dissolution and shelling. Instead, I study post-communist strikes. Amidst all the rapid changes and flux, strikes in Poland are a constant with a long-standing 20-year institutional history. I'll stick with safe and predictable labor unrest and leave it to those who are less faint of heart to study the traumas of parliaments.

—Carrie Timko is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science



Liubov Popova
Design for construction,
The Magnanimous Cuckold, 1922

ASC NEWS

The Center acknowledges with sincere appreciation the following individuals who have contributed to the annual giving program of the Associates of the Slavic Center between January 1 and March 31, 1994. Financial support from the Associates is vital to our program of research, training, and extra curricular activities. We would like to thank all members of ASC for their generous assistance. (*signifies gift of continuing membership)

CENTER CIRCLE

Mr. and Mrs. Ted Brokaw*
Enid Merle Emerson*
Mr. and Mrs. Mark Rosasco*

BENEFACTORS

Anonymous*

SPONSORS

Debbie Y. Ball
Harald Drews*
Peter and Margaret Edgelow*
Rozanne E. Noon, Ph.D.*

MEMBERS

Olga A. Carlisle*
Mitchell Chyette and
Charlene E. Depner
Ralph Fisher*
Yves Franquien*
Maxine Rosner*
Gerald D. Surh*
John Tworek*

Associate Membership

For those of you who are not yet members, we encourage you to join. We believe you will enjoy the stimulating programs; even if you cannot participate as often as you might wish, your continuing contribution critically supports the Center's mission and goals.

Members (\$50 to \$10). Members of ASC regularly receive Newsletter "Updates" and special mailings to notify them of last-minute events and special activities, such as cultural performances and major conferences.

Sponsors (\$100-up). ASC Sponsors also receive a uniquely designed t-shirt, promoting Slavic and East European Studies at Berkeley. They also receive invitations to special informal evening talks on campus featuring guest speakers from the faculty as well as visiting scholars.

Benefactors (\$500-up). ASC Benefactors receive invitations to the dinner and evening programs associated with our annual conferences, such as the annual Berkeley-Stanford Conference in the spring. Benefactors are also entitled to copies of books published by the Center on major developments in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Center Circle (\$1,000-up). Donors within the Center Circle will also become Robert Gordon Sproul Associates of the University. As such, they are invited to the Chancellor's annual black tie banquet and to luncheons before the major football games. They also receive membership in the Faculty Club and twenty other worldwide faculty clubs. The names of donors of \$1,000 or more appear in the Annual Report of Private Giving.



Eight Graduate Students Awarded 1994-95 IREX Fellowships

Eight students in three departments have received IREX grants. Congratulations to Simmy Cover, Arthur McKee, Susan Morrissey, John Randolph and David Rogers (history); Valerie Sperling and David Woodruff (political science); and Robert Wessling (Slavic).

Good going, everyone!

Associates of the Slavic Center

Send your check, made payable to the Regents of the University of California, to the Center for Slavic and East European Studies, 361 Stephens Hall, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720, Attn: ASC.

Name(s) _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Home Phone _____

Business Phone _____

If your employer has a matching gift program, please print name of corporation below.

☐ I have made a contribution but wish to remain anonymous.

It is the policy of the University of California, Berkeley, and the University of California, Berkeley Foundation, that a portion of gifts and/or income therefrom is used to defray the costs of raising and administering the funds.

Donations are tax deductible to the extent authorized by law.

Calendar of Events

Thursday, April 14

BROWN BAG LUNCH: Martin Butora, Slovak writer and sociologist, Trnava University, and Zora Butorova, researcher at the Center for Social Analysis, will speak on "Political Culture and Party Formation in Post Communist Slovakia." 442 Stephens, noon.

Friday, April 15 - Sunday, April 17

CONFERENCE. Annual Outreach Conference: "Divergent Paths of Development in the Post-Communist World." Alumni House.

Monday, April 18

BROWN BAG LUNCH: Ludmila Koryakova, professor, Department of Archaeology at Ural State University in Ekaterinburg, will present a slide lecture on Archaeological Research on the Bronze and Iron Ages of Central Asia and Siberia. 270 Stephens, noon.

SLAVIC COLLOQUIUM: Boris N. Putilov, Head of Folklore Department at the Peter the Great Museum of Anthropology and Ethnology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg, Russia. 4 p.m. Co-sponsored with the Slavic Department. IN RUSSIAN. Location: TBA.

Tuesday, April 19

ANNUAL COLIN MILLER MEMORIAL LECTURE: Ronald G. Suny, Alex Manoogian Professor of Armenian Studies, Department of History, University of Michigan, will speak on "Utopia and Its Discontents: the Soviet Experience and the Fate of Socialism." Lipman Room, 4:00 p.m.

PUBLIC LECTURE: Boris N. Putilov, (see above). "The Principal Propositions of the Historical-Typological Theory in Folklore in Russia." 130 Wheeler Hall, 2:00 p.m.

NO BROWN BAG LUNCH, Wednesday, April 20.

Saturday, April 23

CONCERT: Savina, the Women's Folk Choir, presents songs from Russia, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Hungary and more, accompanied by traditional instruments. Tickets are \$8 and \$9. For tickets, call 510/524-5263. Noe Valley Ministry, 1021 Sanchez, San Francisco. 8:15 p.m.

Monday, April 25

BROWN BAG LUNCH: Izaly Zemtsovsky, Folklore Department, Russian Institute for the History of the Arts, St. Petersburg, will discuss "Folklore and Composers:

Folk Motifs and Tchaikovsky." Co-sponsored by the Slavic Department. 270 Stephens, noon.

April 28 - May 12, 1994

The 37th San Francisco International Film Festival: Tickets for this year's Festival are available now at all BASS Ticket Centers, through mail order and at the Film Festival box office at the AMC Kabuki 8 Theaters. For more information on tickets, call 415/931-FILM. In addition to its site at the Kabuki, the Festival will screen films at the Castro Theater and at the Pacific Film Archive, 2625 Durant Ave., Berkeley; 510/642-1412.

Saturday, April 30

CONCERT: The Slavyanka Chorus performs Russian liturgical and East European folk music. \$12 general, \$8 students and seniors. For ticket information call 415/979-8690. The Showcase Theater, Marin County Civic Center, San Rafael. 7:30 p.m.

Wednesday, May 4

BROWN BAG LUNCH: Virginia Gheorghiu, Hubert Humphrey Fellow and former Deputy Minister, Head of Public Information Department, Bucharest. "Mass Media in East Europe: NewTrends." 270 Stephens, noon.

Wednesday, May 18

BROWN BAG LUNCH: Cvijeto Job, independent journalist from the former Yugoslavia. Topic TBA. 270 Stephens, noon.

Center for Slavic and East European Studies
International and Area Studies
361 Stephens Hall
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720
IV 13



Non-Profit Org.
US Postage PAID
Berkeley, CA
Permit No. 1

ADDRESS CORRECTION REQUESTED

Orthodox Institute
2400 Ridge Road
Berkeley CA 94709